Which of the following is a reason why government plays a necessary role in public health?
AbstractCentres of government (CoGs) have played an important role in tackling the crisis caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. This paper discusses the high-level institutional arrangements put in place by governments to manage policy responses to the pandemic, with a special focus on CoG’s leading or supporting role in three main dimensions: co-ordination and strategic planning, the use of evidence to inform decision-making, and communicating decisions to the public. As governments face unprecedented governance challenges, the pandemic has uncovered gaps in both government co-ordination and the use of evidence for policy making, which directly affect the nature and quality of the measures adopted to tackle the crisis and its aftermath. These challenges have led to a number of quick fixes and agile responses, which will need to be assessed when the worst of the crisis is over. Show
The policy context of a major crisisThe coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic exemplifies the systemic nature of today’s crises and the severe effect they can have on our societies and economies. These crises unfold in a fragmented institutional context, leaving central governments with fewer levers to activate in a crisis and more actors to engage with, from the private sector to local governments and civil society (OECD, 2018[1]). Managing such crises and addressing their socio-economic consequences requires audacious policy action to maintain functioning healthcare systems, guarantee the continuity of education, preserve businesses and jobs, and maintain the stability of financial markets. Political leadership at the centre is essential to sustain the complex political, social and economic balance of adopting containment measures to reduce the impact of the pandemic while ensuring the provision of essential services. Such leadership is essential for maintaining citizens’ trust in government. Simultaneously addressing these various competing policy objectives requires a dual approach working across government “silos”. This is necessary to promote national resilience and preserve well-being with agile and innovative responses at the highest level, while co-ordinating and collaborating with lower levels of governmentand a large array of stakeholders. Institutions comprising the centre of government (CoG) have played an important role in several countries during this current crisis – either directly through CoG bodies or by supporting decision-making bodies and co-ordination mechanisms (see Box 1). Box 1. What is the Centre of Government (CoG)? The CoG is “the body or group of bodies that provide direct support and advice to Heads of Government and the Council of Ministers, or Cabinet” (OECD, 2018[2]). A key institution of the executive branch, it is mandated to ensure elected politicians make decisions informed by coherent evidence and expert analysis, and facilitates co-ordination across government siloes (OECD, 2018[2]).However, the CoG concept does not denote any specific organisational structure: the composition of the CoG can vary depending on the constitutional order, the political system, contextual and historical factors and the Head of Government’s preferences. The CoG thus takes on different names in different countries, including, among others, Chancellery in Germany or the Baltic and Nordic countries, Cabinet Office, Office of the President, Presidencia, US Executive Office of the President, Privy Council in Canada, or Casa Civil in Brazil, Taoiseach in Ireland (OECD, 2014[3]). Therefore, no two countries are identical in their approach to their CoG’s institutional and decision-making arrangements. Functional definitions of the CoG can include institutions or agencies that perform core crosscutting governmental functions, such as planning, co-ordination, prioritisation and policy leadership role, even if they are not reporting directly to or supporting the Head of Government (OECD, Forthcoming[4]). Nevertheless, in general, the role of the centre of government has expanded from purely procedural and agenda-setting functions to playing a more strategic leadership role of supporting the Head of Government and Cabinet (see Figure 1). Source: OECD (2014), Centre Stage: Driving Better Policies from the Centre of Government; OECD (2018), Centre Stage 2 -The organisation and functions of the centre of government in OECD countries; OECD Government at a Glance (2020) OECD (Forthcoming), Policy Framework on Sound Public Governance. Alessandro, M., M. Lafuente and C. Santiso (2013), The Role of the Centre of Government A Literature Review, Institutions for Development , Washington DC.
Figure 1. Key responsibilities of the centre of government Note: Countries were asked about the four areas that are considered the most important areas of responsibility of the CoG. Source: (OECD, 2018[2]) based on the Survey on the Organisation and Functions of the Centre of Government, OECD (2017). The increasing capacities of centres of government in strategic planning and co-ordination place CoGs at a critical juncture to manage government operations in the midst of the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis. In this context, CoGs have to play both a leadership and a supportive convening role, but are they fully equipped to address the crisis? In the event of a crisis, centres of government most commonly focus on the management and co-ordination of government operations (OECD, 2018[2]). In the 2017 Survey on the Organisation and Functions of the Centre of Government, the OECD found that 83% of CoGs assumed some responsibility for risk management, with over a third assuming primary responsibility (OECD, 2018[2]). Despite these figures, only around 10% of CoGs listed “risk management and strategic foresight for the whole of government” as a key responsibility of the centre (see Figure 1). In other words, although CoGs very often assume some or primary responsibility for risk management and strategic foresight, it is rarely considered to be their “bread and butter”. The reporting structures of national frameworks for crisis management can also shed light on the traditional role of the CoG in the event of a crisis. The OECD Survey on the Governance of Critical Risks found that in 13 out of 34 respondents, the lead institution reports directly to the Head of Government, while 19 report through a minister (OECD, 2018[1]). The response to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic exemplifies the ways in which governments adapt their crisis management to a complex crisis and institutional landscape. In particular, governments have often developed complementary approaches to traditional emergency management procedures, led or supported by the centre of government. They had to do so as they were facing many “unknown unknowns”. In many ways, the COVID-19 pandemic became an iconic example of the sort of Black Swan events identified by Nicholas Taieb, unpredictable events of an extreme rarity that generate potentially severe societal consequences that lay beyond the realm of what is normally expected of such an occurrence (Taieb, 2007[5]) This paper raises some key questions around three types of government initiatives during the COVID-19 crisis where centres of government have often played a major role in the frontline:
Leadership and co-ordination from the centre have proved essentialFaced with an unprecedented public health crisis and its dire cascading economic and social consequences, governments across the world have been tasked with responding rapidly, efficiently and coherently to a series of challenges – from co-ordinating emergency responses to managing the immediate economic fallout due to lockdown measures, and determining a timeline and scope for lifting lockdown measures. Before the crisis, most OECD countries had some form of national framework for crisis management, often rooted in civil protection mechanisms, with the aim to strengthen whole-of-government responses for multiple hazards and threats (OECD, 2018[1]). In most cases, these national frameworks were set up in the aftermath of major crises in the last decade for which government and risk management systems were not properly prepared. However, very few OECD countries had faced a pandemic in recent decades, except for the SARS epidemic, which affected countries such as Canada, Korea or Singapore. Due to their past memory of SARS, these countries were better prepared for the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the H1N1 pandemic in the early 2010s proved less severe than anticipated, leading many OECD countries to reduce their investment in the preparedness efforts in the following years, and or to downplay the threat at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak. While the general crisis management frameworks proved useful for the coronavirus crisis in some countries, the novelty, the severity, and the global nature of this new pandemic took many by surprise. This led many governments either to set up new structures or to adopt hybrid approaches using existing and new set-ups, both to manage the health and economic emergencies, and later to lead the deconfinement efforts. The structures used by governments in the first phase of the crisis overwhelmingly focussed on the co-ordination of the coronavirus (COVID-19) policy response. Over time, their functions were adapted to facilitate the monitoring of developments of the crisis while gradually planning for recovery. However, responsibility for risk management and vertical co-ordination with supranational bodies and subnational levels of government were rarely explicitly identified as one of the primary functions of the emergency cabinets and crisis committees managing national responses to the pandemic, even if these were key functions of the CoG. While foresight is an important (and often under-developed) area of the CoG, it is not usually a primary part of the emergency response team itself. Rather, the CoG can instruct the emergency response team to collaborate with the government’s foresight unit (which may or may not be housed within the CoG) to bring foresight into crisis decision-making. Appointed co-ordinators are playing a key role in crisis managementMany countries appointed a co-ordinator or single point of contact to articulate more clearly the national response horizontally across different ministries, sectors, and jurisdictions.
The role of high-level structures to articulate governments’ decision-makingGiven the complexity of the pandemic and its multiple consequences, governments have had to adapt quickly and ensure that appropriate capacity for co-ordination was in place. Emergency institutional arrangements to deal with the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic broadly fall into four categories:
These institutions report mostly to the Prime Minister or the President, with a minority under the authority of the ministry of health and the ministry of the interior in which the CoG plays a more supporting role. Overall, these government responses reflect the need for agility to move up crisis decision-making at a high level, with support provided for by existing structures.
Overall, the structures used by governments to manage the pandemic denote the complexity of this crisis in which central governments must contend with multiple stakeholders. It appears that traditional emergency management, based on standard protocols and procedures have thus become insufficient. In addition to and sometimes in lieu of these standard operating procedures, complementary approaches were deployed to face the pandemic and its dire consequences. This trend reflects the findings of the 2018 OECD report, “Assessing Global Progress in the Governance of Critical Risks”. Indeed, the report found that “(w)hile pre-prepared emergency plans triggered by early-warning systems can be valuable for familiar contingencies, these should be complemented by more agile partnerships across a multi-stakeholder emergency network and by capacities to make sense of complexity and to provide meaning to citizens with renewed crisis communication approaches” (OECD, 2018[1]). All these mechanisms have played a key role in ensuring a compact organisation of the machinery of government in response to COVID-19. The multiplication of mechanisms to manage and co-ordinate government responses to the crisis, while useful for gathering and sharing information and for making policy decisions, can create several governance challenges, including internal co-ordination between those bodies and, especially in federal states, across levels of government, to prevent gaps and overlap and drive coherence in approach. Ensuring coherence of policy decisions at the centre and a uniform application of these decisions across sub-national jurisdictions has been crucial to attain effectiveness, in a context of staggering economic costs due to lockdown measures.
Often, crises have a useful role to help overcome organisational silos with a shared sense of urgency, which is often hard to replicate when government face more traditional issues competing for attention. The CoG’s ability to transfer knowledge acquired during one type of crisis to another will become decisive as the rate, scope and extent of crises facing our societies increase. In this regard, the experience of Singapore in the aftermath of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak is notable. Indeed, while COVID-19 and SARS are very different diseases, with different global impacts, the time-bound structures established during SARS were replicated to tackle the COVID-19 crisis, allowing for a more pro-active response resulting in a relatively low mortality rate. In fact, in a number of jurisdictions and economies, such as Singapore, Korea, as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan, the pre-existing experience of the SARS crisis led to a much higher degree of preparedness, and to greater resilience in adapting to the current crisis. CoGs have also played an important role in co-ordinating the response with sub-national governmentsAs mentioned above, the scope of CoG-led co-ordination of the response to Covid-19 with sub-national governments varies across countries. Much of the debate has focused on the comparative advantages of a centralised over a federal political system and vice-versa (OECD, 2020[32]) (Cockerham and Crew Jr., 2020[33]). The degree of vertical co-ordination led by the CoG, regardless of the nature of the political system, helps shape a country’s response. In many countries, the quality of vertical co-ordination has been a key determinant in the effectiveness of the response to the health and economic crisis. (OECD, 2020[32]) Indeed, sub-national authorities are responsible for crucial aspects of crisis management, in particular those related to containment measures, health care, social services, and economic development. The asymmetric impact of the pandemic, and the distribution of responsibilities among levels of government thus requires a high degree of vertical co-ordination (OECD, 2020[32]). Current evidence suggests that in cases where the CoG plays a role in co-ordinating the response, this role tends to be modulated by two factors: 1) whether sub-national governments are represented in the decision-making bodies managing the crisis and 2) whether substantial institutional mechanisms for co-ordinating with sub-national units were in place before the crisis, and the degree to which sub-national governments themselves possess the administrative, fiscal and technical capacity to engage effectively with the national government in implementing response strategies.
Ensuring trust in decision-making through the use of evidenceThe crisis put governments in a challenging situation where they had to ensure clear, trusted and legitimate decision-making processes informed by the best available evidence, while there were many “unknown unknowns” and the time allowed for dialogue and gathering information was extremely limited. In many cases, this was seen as the best possible approach to deal with such a high level of uncertainty. Issues such as trust in government and trust in expert advice, and the boundary between the experts and the political decision-making interface were brought to the fore by the crisis. Governments were faced with the need to synthesise information from multiple sources and actors, and to use it to feed into governments’ plans and responses to the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis. The pandemic has also challenged government capacities to co-ordinate the quality of evidence, to collect and understand the data as well as to share science and information across countries (OECD, 2020[37]). Many of these challenges were tackled at the highest level through requests from Head of Government’s offices and/or line ministries for scientific advice and technical expertise. The current section examines the institutional set ups that were organised to ensure that centres of government could use scientific advice across countries: their institutional arrangements, functions, and composition and how evidence is gathered, applied and integrated into decision-making processes at the highest level of government in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. The role of evidence also extends to strategic foresight, the use of which to improve decision making during and beyond the crisis is also discussed. Finally, this section discusses the good governance of evidence matters to maintain citizens’ trust in public institutions, which in turn bolsters the effectiveness of government responses to the crisis. Heightened reliance on scientific and technical expertisePolitical leaders have requested scientific advice and technical expertise to understand and respond to the current crisis (OECD, 2020[38]), but many countries have had to set up specific mechanisms at arm’s length from the government, (OECD, 2017[39]) with often a direct link to the centre of government. In many cases, policymakers rely on expertise provided by scientific advisory committees, taskforces or expert groups, whereof some were created on an ad hoc basis, while others pre-date the current crisis. A majority of these committees report to the President, Prime Minister, and/or the Ministry of Health.
In addition to these above cases, other situations might have involved integrating expert groups into the discussions of existing government official committees or even bringing experts to some of the government meetings at ministerial level, or including interactions between experts and ministers or even heads of state. During the coronavirus (COVID-19) crisis, both the ad hoc structures as well as already existing institutions focused on estimating the trajectory of the virus over time and determining countermeasures, ranging from confinement, medical management, to the use of protective equipment.
Challenges in ensuring the governance of evidence based on credible and transparent adviceMaintaining a trusted connection between decision makers and the scientific suppliers of evidence, is essential for effective decision making in an environment faced with very high uncertainty. For example, by including experts from a variety of backgrounds this ensures that decisions are informed by credible, neutral advice. However, the situation presented countries with many unknown unknowns on the health and epidemiological side, while the social and economic implications were significant. In this context, ensuring the proper governance of evidence to provide information in an intelligible trustworthy and empathic manner has represented a challenge for many. A first challenge is the multidisciplinary nature of the required expertise. Scientific advisory committees may benefit from gathering input not only from health experts, but also from other disciplines. However, despite the benefits of a multidisciplinary approach, many advisory committees are composed mostly of epidemiology, virology, public health, and medical experts.
The consultation of civil society organisations, the private sector, citizens, and international organisations can contribute to the quality of the advice given, as well as add credibility and inclusiveness. For instance, the COVID-19 National Co-ordination Commission in Australia is supported by an Executive Board of Directors drawn from across the business and not-for-profit sectors. The Commission co-ordinates advice to the Australian Government on actions to anticipate and mitigate the economic and social impacts of the global COVID-19 pandemic (Government of Australia, 2020[49]). Finally, most scientific committees -- if not all – work closely with national and international research institutes to co-ordinate and share quality and timely evidence. A different approach used in some countries is to position advisory committees as knowledge brokers rather than producers, by engaging stakeholders in academia and research communities in a productive dialogue.
A second challenge is to maintain the CoG’s role as a gatekeeper, ensuring that political decision makers preserve the necessary space for discretion, while gathering a significant amount of evidence in a short period of time. Customarily, the line ministries/policy lead institutions possess the knowledge and expertise, while the CoG establishes and oversees quality control over the rules and processes. However, a rapid and effective response in the COVID-19 crisis requires multiple actors ‒ specialist bodies/expert groups, politicians and policy-makers ‒ to make final decisions. From the available information, a minority of countries have set formal process to ensure quality, authority and legitimacy of a scientific advice, such as peer reviews, professional standing of an advisor, or a mix of both (OECD, 2018[53]). While the institutional set up may reflect countries’ political or administrative culture, it is important to provide reliable and transparent information if the outcome is to be trusted by the public (OECD, 2018[53]). For instance, some quality control practices use the same data and information to build quality checks when multiple agencies run different models, while other practices suggest shared standards for data and accreditation of information suppliers. Nonetheless, overly standardising quality checks can undermine the legitimacy of the advice or data provided at the local level. There is therefore a need to mutual understanding and trust of the outcomes across different countries and crises. (OECD, 2018[53]). A third challenge is the timing between suppliers and users of evidence: obtaining evidence usually requires more time than the policymakers have to make a decision. Thus, short-term policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis could benefit from collaborative research and sharing of preliminary research findings and data (OECD, 2020[54]) to speed up the collection and analyse of evidence. In global emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, open science policies can accelerate the flow of critical research, data, and ideas to combating the disease (OECD, 2020[37]). In addition, policy makers could use interoperable standards and data-sharing agreements involving public sector, private sector and civil society to strengthen the contribution of open data to the crisis, as well as, to support human and institutional capabilities and mechanisms to facilitate access to data (OECD, 2020[37]). Many countries have established, for instance, specific governance structures to co-ordinate activities within the science, technology, and innovation system to promote coherent and mutually supporting actions across institutions and support the achievement of shared common objectives (OECD, 2020[54]). An interesting example comes from South Africa, where a sub-committee was created under the National Command Council to co-ordinate a national framework for research on COVID-19. Its main tasks include mobilising funding across agencies, reprioritising research strategies, and creating ethical and regulatory frameworks to facilitate research on the virus (OECD, 2020[54]). Clarifying the role, deliberation processes of advisory structures and addressing potential conflicts of interest to strengthen trustEvidence shows that in the context of the coronavirus crisis, trust represents a pivotal element for the success of protective measures, which depend on behavioural responses from the public (Betsch, Wieler and Habersaat, 2020[55]). According to the Edelman Trust Barometer, although survey respondents in 11 countries showed a rise in government trust of 65% ‒ the all-time highest ‒ with trust in business decreasing, they also claimed to prefer hearing advice from doctors (80%), scientists (79%), and national health officials (71%), rather than local government leaders (61%) and leaders of their countries (57%) (Edelman Trust Barometer, 2020[56]). As such, in Belgium, scientific experts join government spokespeople to deliver daily public briefings on the pandemic. This also happened in other countries such as in Estonia, where the role of spokesperson in the emergency was shifted from the political level to the chief emergency co-ordinator of the Health Protection Agency. Lessons from previous outbreaks have highlighted the importance of sharing data and publications in order to build and maintain trust between agencies, create preparedness and response systems, and pre-define responsibilities of stakeholders (OECD, 2020[37]). The importance of sharing data has also affected scientific protocols and publications, producing heated debates on the co-ordination of global research and policy implications of some of the findings (ISARIC clinical characterisation group, 2020[57]). Despite the benefits of increased levels of transparency in the decision-making process, in particular as it relates to the scientific advice on which decisions are based, many countries have controlled the nature and quantity of information released to the public. Although the names of scientific committees’ members are often widely accessible, the publication of scientific advice is seldom systematic and often remains at the discretion of the government such as in the UK. Indeed, in a number of advisory committees their members are employed by the government (The Guardian, 2020[58]). Lastly, according to the information collected internally for this paper, the publication of dissenting opinions within the scientific advisory committees is fairly rare. Nevertheless, some countries such as Ireland have adopted a remarkably transparent approach to scientific advice focusing on the pandemic. The National Public Health Emergency Team (NPHET) is the official mechanism for co-ordinating the health sector response in Ireland. It strives to facilitate the circulation of information between the Department of Health and its agencies and provides a forum to build consensus on strategic approaches to this crisis. The agendas and minutes of the NPHET’s meetings are systematically published on the Department of Health website (Government of Ireland, 2020[59]). The minutes report dissenting opinions as well as the measures and policies discussed. The knowledge generated and lessons learned regarding scientific advice during crises do not only allow mutual learning and improved use of scientific advice in crisis management in the short-term, but will also permit to explore how this particular crisis was managed in the long-term. It should be a shared responsibility for both the providers and users of such advice to record, systemise, preserve, and disseminate the information related to the COVID-19 crisis (OECD, 2018[53]). Additionally, members of these scientific task forces are seldom under any obligation to disclose potential conflicts of interest at present. These issues surfaced into the media and public discussions in a number of countries given the economic implications of some of the recommendations and the relation between medical experts and some pharmaceutical companies for example. As such, strengthening the integrity standards and managing the risk of policy capture posed by advisory groups, through standards of conduct and conflict-of-interest management procedures, is also key to ensure trust in and accountability in the decision-making process (OECD, 2003[60]). Effective and coherent public communicationEffective public communication by the centre of government is key in this pandemic to ensure coherence of government messaging both internally and vis-à-vis the public and civil society. Behavioural communication campaigns have played an important role in facilitating the enforcement of regulations, by nudging or instructing wide segments of the population to comply with required measures – from washing their hands, to respecting the provisions of lockdowns and social distancing. Effective communication can help strengthen citizens’ trust in, and engagement with, public policies. It is fundamental in the fight against disinformation and misinformation (OECD, 2020[61]) and (OECD, 2020[62]). Finally, it can help reach specific segments of the population and facilitate dialogue with citizens to ensure that policies and services are adapted to their needs and respond to their expectations. Centres of government and the Head of State or Government they serve have been most prominent in making public addresses about the key policies and milestones of the responses to the pandemic. For example:
In countries where the co-ordination function is less centralised, ministries of health, civil protection agencies and other public institutions have gained more prominence as sources of information and public engagement. Sub-national governments in decentralised or federal countries have also been the primary interlocutors with citizens on their territories. There are advantages for public communication that come from increased co-ordination, such as optimisation of resources, message coherence, and greater audience reach through a larger range of channels and spokespeople. A lack of leadership and organisation on communication from CoGs would reduce coherence and effectiveness, with the risk of setting narratives and developing messages that can be inconsistent or sometimes in conflict with the policy priorities that the CoG aims to communicate. The key risk here includes non-compliance with essential measures such as the wearing of masks for example. Public communications also had to be mobilised as a key means to fight disinformation, which is undermining policy responses and amplifying distrust and concern among citizens. In extreme cases, the “infodemic”, as this surge in misleading and dangerous content was dubbed, was also putting people’s lives at risk. The spread of on- and off-line misinformation, disinformation can reduce compliance with the emergency measures being enacted, thereby threatening their efficacy and public trust in the response. The OECD has proposed key actions to counter this issue, such as supporting a multiplicity of independent fact-checking organisations, ensuring experts are in place to follow-up technological solutions, and improving users’ media, digital and health literacy skills (OECD, 2020[61]). In the past months, centres of government have worked on providing clearer and more definitive information through official channels and media outlets. At the CoG level, the United Kingdom and Italy have, for example, established specific units or task forces to co-ordinate and map out responses to COVID-19 related disinformation (OECD, 2020[62]).
Beyond communications, the level of health literacy of populations is a key issue to keep in mind with regard to tackling disinformation and an important element to consider for building trust. Given gaps in the public’s health knowledge, investing in health literacy is paramount to consider even before a crisis emerges. Centres of government are working to make their messages and contents more compelling and adapted to specific or vulnerable segments of the population. To this end, social media has emerged as a useful tool for crisis communication, with the potential to support two-way crisis communication at a low cost, and maintain trust in government by developing a more direct relationship with citizens (OECD, 2015[64]). Indeed, CoGs need to catch citizens’ attention in a crowded media ecosystem in which stakeholders are increasingly suffering from information overload.
The use of clear language and the customisation of communications material have also proven effective to share complex information with different segments of the population. Disseminating information in more than one language to reach specific groups has also been observed, such as in Sweden (City of Stockholm, 2020[65]), or Belgium where key messages were translated into 32 languages (Government of Belgium, 2020[66]). The cartoon figure “Susana Distancia”, designed by Mexico’s Health Ministry and adopted as the face of communication campaigns led by federal authorities helps share simple and clear information with all age segments of the population (El Universal, 2020[67]). Several other CoGs such as in France and the UK have promoted specific video, audio and written material on the virus for children that were developed by other parts of the government. The role of strategic foresight to inform debate and decision-making at the centre in the longer termThe high level of uncertainty generated by the COVID-19 crisis means that decision makers must continue to prepare for a diverse range of scenarios in both the medium to the longer term. These relate to uncertainties not only surrounding the progression and duration of the medical crisis itself, but also the further cascading impacts for the future of the economy and society. Policy decisions based on untested or unreliable assumptions about the future (such as the expectation that current trends will continue or that conditions will revert naturally to the pre-COVID-19 state of affairs) can prove ineffective and even counterproductive when circumstances change. Governments can use strategic foresight approaches such as scanning for signs of change and preparing for multiple scenarios to promote greater resilience in the medium term. Various approaches can be used. A first approach is stress-testing and future-proofing policy proposals against a diversity of plausible future scenarios, and exploring possible unintended consequences. A second involves exploring further order consequences of the crisis and the new opportunities and challenges these could bring, in order to begin designing appropriate responses sooner. Finally, a third approach may entail broadening the understanding of what may be possible/desirable in the future in order to support more innovative policy thinking and design of policies that respond to present needs in ways that better advance longer-term goals. Together these steps can help strengthen the confidence of decision makers, citizens and other stakeholders (such as investors) that proposed government policies will be more robust and adaptive in face of an uncertain future. The CoG has many key roles in integrating strategic foresight into decision-making. These include collaborating with public sector foresight units to bring foresight into the deliberations, whether in the context of crisis management, or when shaping exit strategies and medium term recovery planning. There is the option of commissioning cross-government work to explore a diversity of possible future scenarios related to the implications of the crisis, and mandating ministries to future-proof their policy recommendations against such scenarios. This work can be led by existing foresight units housed within the CoG where these exist, for example, in Singapore, Finland, and Spain, or by working closely with other foresight units in the public service (as in the case for Canada and the United Kingdom). While foresight is crucial for responsible decision-making during a crisis, it is also a key ingredient to ensuring the government will be better prepared for other possible future disruptions and long-term structural transformations. Thus efforts by the CoG to build the foresight capacity needed for managing the crisis can also have a useful role in the longer term. Strategic insights for policy and governanceFrom a governance perspective, the crisis has uncovered a number of gaps in government co-ordination and leadership and has led to new initiatives to mobilise evidence and disseminate information through communication. As a result, it has been a catalyst for change and innovation at the centre. A few preliminary considerations may be drawn to inform some strategic thinking about the role of the centres of government in the COVID-19 crisis:
Strategic planning is a key function of CoGs (OECD, 2018[68]). While it was challenged by the crisis, it will be needed to organise the removal of restrictions, to manage exit from confinement and economic and social recovery strategies. Governments will need to plan how key sectors (industry, tourism, transport, health, energy) will re-adapt and interact in a world with more restrictive social rules and diminished financial resources. The reprioritisation of government goals and objectives may be required as yet another important measure in response to the crisis, to ensure that strategic goals are adjusted and the administration is able to focus and reprioritise its resources. This will inevitably imply trade-offs among policy goals. In the medium-term, strategic planning will need to embed elements of strategic foresight in order to future proof the long-term viability of strategic initiatives and remain prepared to navigate the unexpected.
Governments can also consider the crisis as an opportunity for transformation and reform, and act accordingly in the future. Indeed, the 2008 financial and economic crisis also implied the creation of ad hoc co-ordinating mechanisms (periodical meetings of senior civil servants, working parties etc.) as well as speeding up the decision-making process and implementation of policies across government. While lessons learnt from the 2008 crisis resulted in an increasingly strategic role of the centres of governments, several challenges and questions remain for centres of government to address in the post-COVID future, which can benefit from sharing good practices in an OECD context. These include:
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This paper benefited from comments from Dorothée Alain-Dupre, Tunyan Bagrat, Charles Baubion, Pauline Bertrand, Duncan Cass-Beggs, Francesca Colombo, Pinar Guven, Klas Klaas, Edwin Lau, Timo Ligi, Luca Lorenzoni, Maria Varinia Michalun, Caroline Penn, Joshua Polchar, Jack Radisch, Carthage Smith, and Andrea Urhammer at the OECD. The authors also wish to acknowledge comments received from country experts, including those who participated during the webinar held on 9th July 2020 on Centres of Government in the Front Line of COVID-19: ‘Maintaining Trust in Government Decision Making through Leadership, Coordination and Evidence’ which gathered 29 countries. Note1. In fact, the OECD Secretariat has done a desk-based review of the institutional arrangements, which can be found at www.oecd.org/gov/Cog/Covid. Subject to review by the OECD Network of Senior Centres of Government Officials. Why is it important for our governments to be interested in the health of its citizens?Public health promotes the welfare of the entire population, ensures its security and protects it from the spread of infectious disease and environmental hazards, and helps to ensure access to safe and quality care to benefit the population.
What are the roles of public health quizlet?Public Health refers to: All organized measures (whether public or private) to prevent disease, promote health, and prolong life among the population as a whole.
Which role is part of the public health core function of the US government select all that apply quizlet?Which are public health core functions of the U.S. government? Select all that apply. The government's role in public health core functions is that of assessment, policy development, and assurance.
Which of the following are core functions of public health select all that apply )?The core functions of Public Health include Assessment, Policy Development, and Assurance.
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