What are the three types of countermeasures?

  Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce the vulnerability of an information system.
Source(s):
FIPS 200 under COUNTERMEASURES from CNSSI 4009

  Protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an information system. Safeguards may include security features, management constraints, personnel security, and security of physical structures, areas, and devices.
Source(s):
FIPS 200 under SAFEGUARDS from CNSSI 4009 - Adapted

  Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce the vulnerability of an information system. Synonymous with security controls and safeguards.
Source(s):
CNSSI 4009-2015 from FIPS 200
NIST SP 800-137 under Countermeasures from CNSSI 4009
NIST SP 800-18 Rev. 1 under Countermeasures from CNSSI 4009

  Protective measures prescribed to meet the security objectives (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an information system. Safeguards may include security features, management controls, personnel security, and security of physical structures, areas, and devices. Synonymous with security controls and countermeasures.
Source(s):
NIST SP 800-128 under safeguards from CNSSI 4009-2015 - Adapted

  The management, operational, and technical controls (i.e., safeguards or countermeasures) prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.
Source(s):
CNSSI 4009-2015 under security controls from FIPS 199

  A safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information system or an organization designed to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its information and to meet a set of defined security requirements.
Source(s):
NIST SP 800-137A under security controls

  The protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an information system. Safeguards may include security features, management constraints, personnel security, and security of physical structures, areas, and devices. Synonymous with security controls and countermeasures.
Source(s):
CNSSI 4009-2015 under safeguards from FIPS 200

  The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an information system or an organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.
Source(s):
NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 2 Rev. 1 under security controls from OMB Circular A-130 (2016)

  Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce the vulnerability of a system. Synonymous with security controls and safeguards.
Source(s):
NIST SP 800-37 Rev. 2 from FIPS 200
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 from FIPS 200
NIST SP 800-53A Rev. 5 from FIPS 200

A countermeasure is an action or method that is applied to prevent, avert or reduce potential threats to computers, servers, networks, operating systems (OS) or information systems (IS). Countermeasure tools include anti-virus software and firewalls.

Virus Scanners Antivirus programs can use one or more techniques to check files and applications for viruses. While virus programs didn’t exist as a concept until 1984, they are now a persistent and perennial problem, which makes maintaining antivirus software a requirement. These programs use a variety of techniques to scan and detect viruses, including signature scanning, heuristic scanning, integrity checks, and activity blocking.

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) In 1991, Phil Zimmerman initially developed PGP as a free e-mail security application, which also made it possible to encrypt files and folders. PGP works by using a public-private key system that uses the International Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) algorithm to encrypt files and email messages.

Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) S/MME secures e-mail by using X.509 certificates for authentication. The Public Key Cryptographic Standard is used to provide encryption, and can work in one of two modes: signed and enveloped. Signing provides integrity and authentication. Enveloped provides confidentiality, authentication, and integrity.

Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) PEM is an older e-mail security standard that provides encryption, authentication, and X.509 certificate-based key management.

Secure Shell (SSH) SSH is a secure application layer program with different security capabilities than FTP and Telnet. Like the two aforementioned programs, SSH allows users to remotely log into computers and access and move files. The design of SSH means that no cleartext usernames/passwords can be sent across the wire. All of the information flowing between the client and the server is encrypted, which means network security is greatly enhanced. Packets can still be sniffed but the information within the packets is encrypted.

Secure Electronic Transmission (SET) SET is a protocol standard that was developed by MasterCard, VISA, and others to allow users to make secure transactions over the Internet. It features digital certificates and digital signatures, and uses of Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).

Terminal Access Controller Access Control System (TACACS) Available in several variations, including TACACS, Extended TACACS (XTACACS), and TACACS +. TACACS is a centralized access control system that provides authentication, authorization, and auditing (AAA) functions.

Kerberos Kerberos is a network authentication protocol created by the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology (MIT) that uses secret-key cryptography and facilitates single sign-on. Kerberos has three parts: a client, a server, and a trusted third party (Key Distribution Center [KDC] or AS) to mediate between them.

SSL Netscape Communications Corp. initially developed SSL to provide security and privacy between clients and servers over the Internet. It’s application-independent and can be used with HTTP, FTP, and Telnet. SSL uses Rivest, Shamir, & Adleman (RSA) public key cryptography and is capable of client authentication, server authentication, and encrypted SSL connection.

Transport Layer Security (TLS) TLS is similar to SSL in that it is application-independent. It consists of two sublayers: the TLS record protocol and the TLS handshake protocol.

Windows Sockets (SOCKS) SOCKS is a security protocol developed and established by Internet standard RFC 1928. It allows client–server applications to work behind a firewall and utilize their security features.

Secure RPC (S/RPC) S/RPC adds an additional layer of security to the RPC process by adding Data Encryption Standard (DES) encryption.

IPSec IPSec is the most widely used standard for protecting IP datagrams. Since IPSec can be applied below the application layer, it can be used by any or all applications and is transparent to end users. It can be used in tunnel mode or transport mode.

Point-to-point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) Developed by a group of vendors including Microsoft, 3Com, and Ascend, PPTP is comprised of two components: the transport that maintains the virtual connection and the encryption that insures confidentiality. PPTP is widely used for virtual private networks (VPNs).

Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) CHAP is an improvement over previous authentication protocols such as Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) where passwords are sent in cleartext. CHAP uses a predefined secret and a pseudo random value that is used only once (i.e., a hash is generated and transmitted from client to server). This facilitates security because the value is not reused and the hash cannot be reversed-engineered.

Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) While not perfect, WEP attempts to add some measure of security to wireless networking. It is based on the RC4 symmetric encryption standard and uses either 64-bit or 128-bit keys. A 24-bit Initialization Vector (IV) is used to provide randomness; therefore, the “real key” may be no more than 40 bits long. There have been many proven attacks based on the weaknesses of WEP.

Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) WPA was developed as a replacement for WEP. It delivers a more robust level of security. WPA uses Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP), which scrambles the keys using a hashing algorithm and adds an integrity-checking feature that verifies that the keys haven’t been tampered with. Next, WPA improves on WEP by increasing the IV from 24 bits to 48 bits. WPA also prevents rollover (i.e., key reuse is less likely to occur). Finally, WPA uses a different secret key for each packet.

Packet Filters Packet filtering is configured through access control lists (ACLs). ACL’s allow rule sets to be built that will allow or block traffic based on header information. As traffic passes through the router, each packet is compared to the rule set and a decision is made whether the packet will be permitted or denied.

Network Address Translation (NAT) Originally developed to address the growing need for intrusion detection (ID) addresses, NAT is discussed in RFC 1631. NAT can be used to translate between private and public addresses. Private IP addresses are those considered non-routable (i.e., public Internet routers will not route traffic to or from addresses in these ranges).

Fiber Cable The type of transmission media used can make a difference in security. Fiber is much more secure than wired alternatives and unsecured wireless transmission methods.

Secure Coding It is more cost-effective to build secure code up front than to try and go back and fix it later. Just making the change from C to a language such as .NET or CSharp can have a big security impact. The drive for profits and the additional time that QA for security would introduce, causes many companies to not invest in secure code.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9781597491099500058

Access Control Design

Thomas L. Norman CPP/PSP, in Electronic Access Control (Second Edition), 2017

Application Concepts

Alarm/access control systems use access control readers, electrified locks, request-to-exit sensors, door alarms, and volumetric and point alarms to defend facilities against inappropriate access by unauthorized users.

Use a layered security approach. This is a combination of detection and access layers placed over each other at geographical progression toward the most valuable assets (see Fig. 27.1).

What are the three types of countermeasures?

Figure 27.1. Layered security.

The basic goals of electronic security countermeasures include:

Access control

Deterrence

Detection

Assessment

Coordinating response

Evidence gathering

It is essential that all these goals should be met in the design of a comprehensive coordinated security program.

Security system designs should also be robust and redundant, expandable, flexible, and easy to use. And they should be sustainable.

Robust design

The quality of design and the quality of the installation work both have a strong bearing on how robust a system is. Poorly designed and installed systems have exposed wiring, exposed plug-in power supplies, fragile mounting of equipment, little or no shrouding of cameras, and exposed door position switches with loose wiring. The use of conduit alone instead of loose wiring creates a much more robust system. When you open an equipment cabinet, wiring should be neatly organized and well marked. There should be drawings in each cabinet to help the maintenance technician, or else he has to probe around in the wiring to figure out which wire goes to what equipment. All that probing can pull cables loose, creating another service call. All of these things create an unreliable system. If it doesn’t look robust, trust me, it isn’t.

Redundancy

The system should have redundancy such that if one component fails, another is there to take its place functionally. There are two ways to do this. First, use systems that have internal redundancy such as using equipment with redundant power supplies, redundant Ethernet connections, and redundant processing. Secondly, use the layered security approach so that if one component fails, detection occurs through another component. Remember the earlier umbrella intrusion example? A second motion detector facing the rear door inside the back room would have caught the intrusion the second the umbrella was inserted. A video camera on that area and on the outside of the back door might have helped identify the offender. This shop owner actually turned off his digital recorder after hours to preserve memory. He was using it to record activities in his customer area during open hours only, which was a very foolish procedure.

Expandable and flexible

A good designer designs systems so they are expandable and flexible. Even when everything about the project reeks of “this is a fixed design with no chance of ever changing,” it is still best to incorporate expansion and flexibility into the design. For example, when designing a security system for my own home, I was certain of the design requirements, and those requirements could be filled by a very economical alarm system. I designed one with double that capacity. The alarm installer tried to sell me another alarm panel having just the needed capacity, which I declined. I wanted double. Within 1 year, things changed and I needed about half the available capacity for some unexpected changes. If I can’t be sure about the future in my own home, how can any designer ever be certain about the future needs of a client. The short answer is you can’t. Always design spare capacity and flexibility into the design. In almost every case, it can be done for little to nothing extra.

Easy to use

Please, please do not skip this section. I continue, after 35 years in this business, to find security systems that either require a PhD to operate or that are so confusingly configured that virtually no one knows what is going on in the system.

Please, do not get creative in system operation. Keep it simple. I actually have a design goal of 5 minutes of training to learn how to monitor a security console. I achieve that goal, and you can too. Still, there is plenty happening deeper in the system that you could find and operate, it is just that with only 5 minutes of training you can operate the basic monitoring functions. It is doable.

I witnessed part of the commissioning of a security system in Algeria where not a single one of the operators could read English, and the system was programmed entirely in English. That is just inexcusable. The contractor’s excuse was that they should use operators that could read and speak English. Lots of luck on that in Algeria!

Sustainable

The idea of sustainability is relatively new to security system designers, but it should have been a primary part of design a very long time ago. All systems have a finite operating life, but you can extend that substantially through good design and good maintenance.

Good design: First, understand that all devices have market life cycles.

Design idea

Prototype

Early market product used by early adopters

Commodity market (make lots of them and sell as many as you can)

Late market (old ho-hum technology)

End of life (sorry, we do not support that line anymore)

It is better never to design or install a system that is late market technology. I have sat in a conference room with product representatives who told me straight-faced that I should hurry to specify their old product line because it was going to be replaced very soon by a new line and then it would not be available anymore. Somehow they thought that was a selling point. Specify and install products that have considerable life left. Additionally, designing a robust system also helps make it sustainable.

Good maintenance: Many systems die an early death due to poor maintenance.

You can sustain a system for many years by conducting good scheduled maintenance. I recommend daily checks of all field equipment. This can be done while on rounds by opening every access control door triggering every alarm and appearing on every camera. By conducting a routine guard tour and coupling it with a system operation checklist, you kill two birds with one stone. Reports each day result in either emergency maintenance needs or a device or two that must be put into the scheduled maintenance bucket. Have a certified maintenance technician visit the site at least once every month to take care of the scheduled maintenance work. Use only technicians certified by the manufacturer of the equipment so they know what they are doing.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128054659000270

Optimum Countermeasure Portfolio Selection

Maryam Shahpasand, Sayed Alireza Hashemi Golpayegani, in Emerging Trends in ICT Security, 2014

Deploying an appropriate collection of information security countermeasures in an organization should result in high-level blocking power against existing threats. In this chapter, a new knapsack-based approach is proposed for finding out which subset of countermeasures is the best at preventing probable security attacks. In this regard, an effectiveness score is defined for each countermeasure based on its mitigation level against all threats. Organizations are always looking for more effective low-cost solutions, so another consideration is that the implementation cost of the selected countermeasure portfolio should not exceed the allocated budget. Following the knapsack idea, the implementation cost of each countermeasure and its effectiveness, defined as inputs and the best subset, are chosen with respect to budget limits. Our results are compared with similar research and recommend the same countermeasure portfolio.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780124114746000190

Electronics Elements (High-Level Discussion)

Thomas Norman CPP, PSP, CSC, in Integrated Security Systems Design (Second Edition), 2014

Detection Elements

If deterrence is the ultimate goal of security countermeasures, then detection is where deterrence begins.2 The ability to detect is at the heart of eliminating the probability of success of the criminal or terrorist mission. Detection is a process that includes sensing, processing, and transmitting the detection, and reporting it to someone who can act.3

Alarm Sensors

There are many types of alarm sensors, including the following:

Point detection (e.g., door, window, duress [panic switch] and floor-pad switches)

Beam detection (photoelectric, pulsed infrared, or laser beams)

Volumetric: The sensing of motion in a defined area (includes passive infrared, microwave, radar, and lidar technologies)

Relay detection: Sensing the condition of another process or system

Capacitance detection (These commonly include numerous perimeter detection systems that detect the presence of a person in an area where he or she should not be.)

Intelligent detection: Utilization of microprocessors and software to cause detection of a specific behavior or condition in specific circumstances (also includes video analytics and thermal video)

Alarm Processors

In most cases involving sophisticated electronic security systems (including all enterprise security systems), the detection is processed locally before it is transmitted. Processing may involve simple decisions such as whether the detection is occurring during an appropriate time period (no volumetric alarms in an office building lobby during normal working hours). The processing may be more extensive, such as checking to determine if a group of conditions are right to trigger the alarm. The processing typically occurs in an alarm and access control system controller. Usually, the processor will also perform a check to ensure that the detection was received OK.

Alarm Transmission

Once the alarm is processed, it must be transmitted to someone who can take action on the detection. In the past, this occurred over RS-485 or similar data lines. Today, almost all integrated system alarm transmissions are over TCP/IP Ethernet connections. These are sometimes converted to fiber-optic or wireless (802.11 or other) mediums.

Alarm Reporting

The detection is received by a monitoring device and is acknowledged by a person who can act on it. In enterprise security systems, the detection is almost always displayed on a computer with specialized software that is also capable of integrating access control, CCTV, voice communications, and ancillary systems integration, which may include two-way radio, private automatic branch exchange (PABX), elevators, building automation, information technology, and other systems.

Follow-on Action Response

Following detection and assessment, the security system should assist in preventing an adversary from successful completion of a malevolent action against a facility.4 Follow-on action is that integration element that allows the enterprise security system to do some amazing things. For example, based on detection of an intrusion into a highly restricted area, the system can implement delaying barriers that might include dispatching personnel, activating vehicle or pedestrian barriers (e.g., rising bollards or roll-down doors), dousing all lights, and disorienting audio signals (sounding alarms within the structure, which raises the anxiety level of the aggressor) to disrupt the progress of the attackers.5 Follow-on actions can also facilitate access for a legitimate user, such as turning on lights from a parking garage through lobbies, corridors, and to the exact office suite of a card holder.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978012800022900005X

Program Management

Charles A. Sennewald, Curtis Baillie, in Effective Security Management (Sixth Edition), 2016

Personnel

Ironically, the utilization of people as a security countermeasure can be the most efficient and effective strategy or, depending on the circumstances, the poorest.

Because of the ongoing expense of personnel (not only for salaries but also full benefit package, supervision, and replacement), every effort should be exercised to cure risks whenever possible by means other than utilizing people. The rule of thumb is to use people only in those areas where procedural controls, hardware, or electronics cannot be employed more efficiently.

There are security functions for which people are the best and sometimes the only countermeasure. The critical factor in the decision to use people, one that is their greatest attribute that can never be replaced, is their ability to exercise judgment. Wherever judgment is essential in carrying out a security function, people should be utilized. A common example might be the job of overseeing employees as they leave work in a production plant by inspecting lunch pails and other containers. Personnel are essential for a variety of other roles that cannot be affected by procedures, hardware, or electronics. Among these functions are guard posts and patrols, inspections, investigations, prevention of criminal attacks, maintenance of order, and crowd control.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128027745000174

From User-Land to Kernel-Land Attacks

Enrico Perla, Massimiliano Oldani, in A Guide to Kernel Exploitation, 2011

Kernel-Land Exploits Versus User-Land Exploits

We described the kernel as the entity where many security countermeasures against exploitation are implemented. With the increasing diffusion of security patches and the contemporary reduction of user-land vulnerabilities, it should come as no surprise that the attention of exploit writers has shifted toward the core of the operating system. However, writing a kernel-land exploit presents a number of extra challenges when compared to a user-land exploit:

The kernel is the only piece of software that is mandatory for the system. As long as your kernel runs correctly, there is no unrecoverable situation. This is why user-land brute forcing, for example, is a viable option: the only real concern you face when you repeatedly crash your victim application is the noise you might generate in the logs. When it comes to the kernel, this assumption is no longer true: an error at the kernel level leaves the system in an inconsistent state, and a manual reboot is usually required to restore the machine to its proper functioning. If the error occurs inside one of the sensible areas of the kernel, the operating system will just shut down, a condition known as panic. Some operating systems, such as Solaris, also dump, if possible, the information regarding the panic into a crash dump file for post-mortem analysis.

The kernel is protected from user land via both software and hardware. Gathering information about the kernel is a much more complicated job. At the same time, the number of variables that are no longer under the attacker's control increases exponentially. For example, consider the memory allocator. In a user-land exploit, the allocator is inside the process, usually linked through a shared system library. Your target is its only consumer and its only “affecter.” On the other side, all the processes on the system may affect the behavior and the status of a kernel memory allocator.

The kernel is a large and complex system. The size of the kernel is substantive, perhaps on the order of millions of lines of source code. The kernel has to manage all the hardware on the computer and most of the lower-level software abstractions (virtual memory, file systems, IPC facilities, etc.). This translates into a number of hierarchical, interconnected subsystems that the attacker may have to deeply understand to successfully trigger and exploit a specific vulnerability. This characteristic can also become an advantage for the exploit developer, as a complex system is also less likely to be bug-free.

The kernel also presents some advantages compared to its user-land counterpart. Since the kernel is the most privileged code running on a system (not considering virtualization solutions; see the following note), it is also the most complicated to protect. There is no other entity to rely on for protection, except the hardware.

Note

At the time of this writing, virtualization systems are becoming increasingly popular, and it will not be long before we see virtualization-based kernel protections. The performance penalty discussion also applies to this kind of protection. Virtualization systems must not greatly affect the protected kernel if they want to be widely adopted.

Moreover, it is interesting to note that one of the drawbacks of some of the protections we described is that they introduce a performance penalty. Although this penalty may be negligible on some user-land applications, it has a much higher impact if it is applied to the kernel (and, consequently, to the whole system). Performance is a key point for customers, and it is not uncommon for them to choose to sacrifice security if it means they will not incur a decrease in performance. Table 1.1 summarizes the key differences between user-land exploits and kernel-land exploits.

Table 1.1. Differences between user-land and kernel-land exploits

Attempting to…User-land exploitsKernel-land exploitsBrute-force the vulnerabilityThis leads to multiple crashes of the application that can be restarted (or will be restarted automatically; for example, via inetd in Linux).This leads to an inconsistent state of the machine and, generally, to a panic condition or a reboot.Influence the targetThe attacker has much more control (especially locally) over the victim application (e.g., the attacker can set the environment it will run in). The application is the only consumer of the library subsystem that uses it (e.g., the memory allocator).The attacker races with all the other applications in an attempt to “influence” the kernel. All the applications are consumers of the kernel subsystems.Execute shellcodeThe shellcode can execute kernel system calls via user-land gates that guarantee safety and correctness.The shellcode executes at a higher privilege level and has to return to user land correctly, without panicking the system.Bypass anti-exploitation protectionsThis requires increasingly more complicated approaches.Most of the protections are at the kernel level but do not protect the kernel itself. The attacker can even disable most of them.

The number of “tricks” you can perform at the kernel level is virtually unlimited. This is another advantage of kernel complexity. As you will discover throughout the rest of this book, it is more difficult to categorize kernel-land vulnerabilities than user-land vulnerabilities. Although you can certainly track down some common exploitation vectors (and we will!), every kernel vulnerability is a story unto itself.

Sit down and relax. The journey has just begun.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9781597494861000012

The Security Design Process

Thomas Norman CPP, PSP, CSC, in Integrated Security Systems Design (Second Edition), 2014

Establishing Electronic Security Program Objectives

Electronic security in general is a subset of the overall security countermeasures that should be implemented for any organization. In my opinion, electronics should be the last element to be implemented. Yes, you heard me right… the last. That statement is coming from a person who has made a nearly lifelong career out of designing electronic security systems. There is a hierarchy to security countermeasures, and it should start with policies and procedures, then physical and network security, security awareness training, operational security programs, and, finally, electronic security. It does no good to have cameras and card readers if the building is not locked at night. Ridiculous, you say? You can point to any 10 high-rise or corporate buildings that are more than 20 years old, and I assure you that on average more than 90% of those buildings have no record of who held the master keys to the building going back 10 years, let alone the life of the building. A master key gives the holder access to virtually every asset in the building. Master keys leave no trace of who used them, and many building electronic security systems are not monitored 24 hours a day and do not have useful cameras on every door. Even with cameras, the master key holder can conceal his or her identity from them. Electronics is the high priest of false security. So first, as a designer, do no harm. Advise the owner to secure the building with strong physical security. Next, how many organizations run effective background checks of their employees, contractors, and vendors (and their contractors’ employees)? Second principle: Do not let criminals into the building. Please—advise the owner. So the foundation is to establish and prioritize overall security objectives.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128000229000085

Hiding in Plain Sight

Will Gragido, John Pirc, in Cybercrime and Espionage, 2011

Java Code Obfuscation

This is a method that is also used to bypass security countermeasures such as antivirus, network intrusion prevention systems, and host intrusion prevention systems. The following is just an example of obfuscating code that is used to run on the target system. The online tool used below is provided by iWEBTOOL.com. Again, it is important to point out that the intent of this tool was probably not to be used in a nefarious manner. The example in Figure 11.12 is a bogus Website, but an example of what is used in an iFrame injection. If the security countermeasures are in place looking for iFrames, it may have a hard time finding a match as this is now running as a java script. It is important to understand that the conversion below is not really encrypted. It is basically taking the input and translating into hexadecimal code to avoid detection.

What are the three types of countermeasures?

Figure 11.12. Obfuscated JavaScript.

Another popular place that you will find JavaScript utilizing unescape is within a PDF. The great thing about PDFs, from a nefarious cyber actor's point of view, is that they are widely deployed and are a great vector for obfuscating JavaScript, which can execute in a PDF viewer. This is a commonly used method for bypassing intrusion prevention systems and antivirus. However, a great way to combat malicious java script within your PDF is to disable JavaScript (Figure 11.13).

What are the three types of countermeasures?

Figure 11.13. Adobe preferences for turning off the execution of JavaScript.

Because of the widespread use of malicious PDFs, it would be a great idea to launch your Adobe reader and click “Edit,” click “Preferences” and make sure to uncheck “Enable Acrobat JavaScript.” The previous examples we provided on packing, encryption, and JavaScript obfuscation are just a few ways in which nefarious cyber actors can bypass and test the validity of their exploits. The tools referenced are widely known above ground. Tools that are used by the underground often take time to find and with the right information you can come across some very interesting ones. Blaze Botnet is a tool that the author Will Gragido stumbled on.

Read moreNavigate Down

View chapterPurchase book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B978159749613100011X

Introduction

—Jennifer (Jabbusch) Minella CISSP, in Low Tech Hacking, 2012

Chapter 8: Information security awareness training: Your most valuable countermeasure to employee risk

Sean Lowther describes ways to incorporate Security Awareness Training as one of your least expensive and most effective security countermeasures. Jack met Sean about 5 years ago at a security conference and immediately recognized Sean as a world-class leader in the development of security awareness programs for organizations of all sizes. Sean is well known for designing a remarkably effective enterprise-wide awareness program at Bank of America. His program received the highest rating from the bank's regulators, and was consistently rated world class by industry peer groups. Sean firmly believes the success of a security plan is achieved by involving each and every employee. This chapter outlines the processes, procedures, and materials needed to build and measure a successful awareness program, as well as tips and tricks to keep employees engaged and make security part of the company mindset.

Read moreNavigate Down

Read full chapterView PDFDownload book

Read full chapter

URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9781597496650000137

System Security Engineering for Information Systems

Logan O. Mailloux, ... Gerald Baumgartner, in Emerging Trends in ICT Security, 2014

The system security engineering process

The foundation of SSE rests on cost-benefit decision tradeoffs focused on engineering out vulnerabilities and designing in security countermeasures as long-term cost saving measures [1]. The SSE process was originally considered for the design and development of systems with respect to the acquisition life cycle phases shown in Figure 1.1, while program protection addresses operations and support in phase IV:

What are the three types of countermeasures?

Figure 1.1. DoD Acquisition management phases [2].

Phase 0. Develop system security criteria, describe the baseline security system design, and conduct security threat and vulnerability studies.

Phase I. Analyze and validate the system security baseline, prepare preliminary performance specifications for security hardware and software, and process identified threats and vulnerabilities through system design modifications and risk management techniques.

Phase II. Design and integrate the security system, acquire or develop security system hardware and software against the specifications.

Phase III. Implement the security system design via production and conduct deployment planning.

Phase IV. Address operational and support security concerns through continual risk management via the program protection process.

From this description we note fundamental items of interest that constitute core SSE MPTs. Risk management forms the crux of US DoD system security and protection efforts through threat identification and vulnerability analysis serving as the basis for all SSE decisions. Of great importance, system security requirements are also emphasized from initial concept exploration to implementation and production. Lastly, integrated throughout the acquisition process is the system security baseline, which serves as the foundation for security tradeoffs.

In the 1990s, industry and government supported the development of a System Security Engineering–Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) to help standardize and assess SSE practices. The SSE-CMM was accepted by the International Organization for Standardization/Intentional Electrotechnical Commission in 2002 and revised again in 2008 [3]. The SSE-CMM formalizes SSE into three separate process areas: risk, engineering, and assurance. The SSE-CMM provides SSE goals consistent with MIL-HDBK-1785 [1], while further attempting to address and clarify difficult security concepts such as assurance and trust:

Gain understanding of the security risks associated with an enterprise;

Establish a balanced set of security needs in accordance with identified risks;

Determine that operational impacts due to residual security vulnerabilities in a system or its operation are tolerable (i.e., determine acceptable risks);

Transform security needs into security guidance to be integrated into the activities of other disciplines employed on a project and into descriptions of a system configuration or operation;

Establish confidence or assurance in the correctness and effectiveness of security mechanisms; and

Integrate the efforts of all engineering disciplines and specialties into a combined understanding of the trustworthiness of a system.

What are the types of countermeasure?

Other hardware countermeasures include: biometric authentication systems. physical restriction of access to computers and peripherals..
personal firewalls..
application firewalls..
anti-virus software..
pop-up blockers..
spyware detection/removal programs..

What are countermeasures?

Countermeasures are those actions, processes, devices, or systems that can prevent or mitigate the effects of threats to a facility.

What are physical countermeasures?

Physical security countermeasures are measures used to counter specific threats to an asset. A countermeasure is either requirement based or cost-benefit analysis based. A General Service Administration (GSA)-approved security container is an example of a requirement base countermeasure.

What are countermeasures in cyber security?

Definition(s): Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce the vulnerability of an information system. Protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an information system.