Which of the following does not describe the majority vote method of decision-making?

Abstract

Unanimity rule is an important benchmark for evaluating outcomes of decisions in the social sciences. However, organizational researchers tend to ignore unanimous decision making, for example, because unanimity may be difficult to realize in large groups and may suffer from individual participants blocking decisions. This paper reconsiders unanimity rule in view of the development of circular systems for organizing decision making. It focuses on developing a theory of decision making under unanimity rule. The author uses a system dynamics model to explore the conditions under which unanimity rule supports the organization's ability to make decisions. Simulation experiments suggest that the dynamics and outcomes of unanimous decision making under and exceeding a critical threshold level of decision pressure are fundamentally different. Under this critical threshold, the decision-making system is capable of recovering from severe shocks to the system. If decision pressure is close to its threshold, a relatively small change can cause the decision process to collapse. In this respect, large groups operating under unanimity rule are less sustainable because they are more likely to exceed their critical threshold than small groups. Decomposing the decision-making system in small units, embedded in a hierarchical structure, therefore appears to be a necessary condition for sustainable performance in large organizations applying unanimity rule.

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This unique journal scans the globe for new research that draws upon multiple disciplines or levels of analysis: achieves genuine integration of theory, data, and managment applications; and improves organizational functioning. Artificial Intelligence Communications Theory Economics History Hypercompetition Information Science Organization theory Political Science Psychology Strategic Management Systems Theory

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With over 12,500 members from around the globe, INFORMS is the leading international association for professionals in operations research and analytics. INFORMS promotes best practices and advances in operations research, management science, and analytics to improve operational processes, decision-making, and outcomes through an array of highly-cited publications, conferences, competitions, networking communities, and professional development services.

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Organization Science © 2004 INFORMS
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Abstract

Eighty 3-person groups each made three decisions involving a choice among a number of alternatives arranged along a continuum. Half the groups made decisions by majority rule, and half by unanimity rule. Payoffs were awarded for the alternatives in such a way that each group member preferred one alternative the most, and preferred other alternatives less the farther they were from this most preferred position. Each of the three members held a different position, with two (Left and Center) holding positions relatively close together on the continuum and the third (Right) holding a position farther from the other two. In half the groups under each decision rule, members were informed of one another's preferences (payoffs) for the alternatives (complete-information condition), and in half they were not (no-information condition). It was found that in the no-information condition, decisions under majority and unanimity rule did not differ, but in the complete-information condition, unanimous decisions fell farther to the right (i.e., closer to the position of the most extreme member) than did majority decisions. The difference between majority and unanimity decisions in the complete-information condition was partly due to a strong tendency for majority rule to lead to a decision halfway between the positions of Left and Center, and for unanimity rule to lead to a decision halfway between extremes of Left and Right.

Journal Information

Social Psychology Quarterly (SPQ) publishes theoretical and empirical papers on the link between the individual and society, including the study of the relations of individuals to one another, as well as to groups, collectivities and institutions. It also includes the study of intra-individual processes insofar as they substantially influence or are influenced by social structure and process. SPQ is genuinely interdisciplinary, publishing works by both sociologists and psychologists. Published quarterly in March, June, September and December.

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American Sociological Association Mission Statement: Serving Sociologists in Their Work Advancing Sociology as a Science and Profession Promoting the Contributions and Use of Sociology to Society The American Sociological Association (ASA), founded in 1905, is a non-profit membership association dedicated to advancing sociology as a scientific discipline and profession serving the public good. With over 13,200 members, ASA encompasses sociologists who are faculty members at colleges and universities, researchers, practitioners, and students. About 20 percent of the members work in government, business, or non-profit organizations. As the national organization for sociologists, the American Sociological Association, through its Executive Office, is well positioned to provide a unique set of services to its members and to promote the vitality, visibility, and diversity of the discipline. Working at the national and international levels, the Association aims to articulate policy and impleme nt programs likely to have the broadest possible impact for sociology now and in the future.

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Social Psychology Quarterly © 1985 American Sociological Association
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